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Detection Performance to Spatially Random UAV
Using the Ground Vehicle
Kezhi Wang, Senior Member, IEEE, Hongjiang Lei, Senior Member, IEEE, Gaofeng Pan, Senior Member, IEEE,
Cunhua Pan, Member, IEEE, Yue Cao
.
Abstract—It is very challenging to detect an unmanned-
aerial-vehicle (UAV) when it is applied to launch an attack
by the enemy’s country, due to its feature of mobility and
flexibility. Against this background, in this paper, from wireless
communication point of view, we study the detection probability
of home country’s ground vehicle (GV) to enemy’s ground-
station (GS)-to-UAV transmission system. We assume that the
location of the GV is randomly distributed inside the space
confined by the largest detection distance. Moreover, we assume
the enemy’s UAV is randomly distributed in the coverage space
of the GS-to-UAV (G2A) transmission link but also keep the
security distance from the GS. To this end, we first characterize
the statistical features of the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) over the
G2V and G2A links. Then, we define detection outage probability
(DOP) and average detection capacity (ADC), and show their
approximations. Finally, Monte-Carlo simulations are conducted
to verify the correctness of our proposed analytical models.
Index Terms—Average Detection Capacity, Detection Outage
Probability, Spatially Random UAV, Ground Vehicle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there is an growing popularity of applying un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in a wide range of civilian
applications, such as terrestrial communications, vehicular
networks and entertainment areas [1], [2]. Additionally, the
application of UAVs in military areas, such as surveillance
and strikes have also been investigated in past years by several
countries [3]. For instance, how to apply the UAV to launch
attacks or conduct reconnaissance has been studied in [4].
On the other hand, it may be even more important to
investigate how to prevent the home country from the attacks
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or reconnaissance from the UAVs deployed by the enemy
country, from the national defence perspective. For instance,
if the home country suffers the attack from enemy’s UAV in
emergency situations, it is essential to detect this UAV fast
and effectively. However, this problem is rarely studied in
the literature and is very challenging to solve. This is due
to the fact that the enemy’s UAV can move flexibly and
freely in the 3-dimensional (3D) space and thus difficult to
be detected. Furthermore, as the enemy’s UAV always keeps
changing its direction and position, which may further increase
the difficulty of detection from the home country.
Motivated by the above observations, in this paper, we
aim to investigate the detection probability of home country’s
ground vehicle (GV) to enemy’s UAV system. To this end,
we assume there is one hidden GS, deployed by the enemy
to home country, trying to control its UAV via wireless link.
Also, we assume the home country deploys a GV to detect the
enemy’s GS-to-UAV (G2A) communication link. We consider
the randomness of the locations of the UAV and GV, by using
the stochastic geometry theory. For G2A link, we assume that
it is dominated by the large-scale fading, while for GS-to-GV
(G2V) detection link, we assume it is not only affected by
the large-scale fading but also by the small-scale fading, i.e.,
Nakagami fading.
Our proposed model can be applied to the emergency
situation where the enemy invades the home country via UAV
systems. Moreover, one can see that if the home country can
successfully detect the enemy’s UAVs via wireless communi-
cation channel, it may not only stop the attack or surveillance
of the enemy’s UAV, but also be able to possibly “hijack” or
take over enemy’s UAV to its own use. This is because if
we can detect the communication signal of the enemy’s UAV,
we may decode/eavesdrop/crack their signal with further effort
if possible and then send new control data to take over this
UAV. The model may also be extended to enhance our physical
layer security with some modifications, similar to [5]. This is
due to fact that if we can detect the communication link of
the enemy’s UAV, we may possibly enhance our transmitted
signal over their eavesdropping signals to guarantee our secure
information transmission. Additionally, our analysis can be
seen as the benchmark or upper bound of the scenarios where
there are jammers deployed along with the enemy’s UAV. The
main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
• We define the detection outage probability (DOP) to cap-
ture the detection capacity of the GV from the home country to
the enemy’s UAV. The probability density function (PDF) and
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cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the signal-to-noise-
ratio (SNR) of both G2V and G2A links are characterized.
To gain more insights, we obtain the lower bound of DOP in
closed form.
• Furthermore, we present the average detection capacity
(ADC) and to facilitate the analysis, we present the approx-
imation of ADC, with the help of Meijer’s G-function and
Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND STATISTICAL FEATURES
Consider a scenario that an enemy’s UAV aims to attack
or reconnoitre the home country. One hidden GS (G) is
deployed by the enemy to the home country trying to com-
municate/guide this UAV (A) via G2A wireless system, as








Fig. 1. Detection scenario of GV to the enemy’s GS-to-UAV wireless system.
the home country, trying to detect the information transmitted
from the enemy’s GS to the UAV, via G2V links. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the hidden GS is located
in the center of a circle, where the GV is modelled as the
randomly and uniformly distributed point, inside this circle.
Define the radius of the circle as D (D > 0), which capture
the largest detection distance of the G2V link. Also, define
two hemispheres which share the common center where GS
is located. The small hemisphere represents the area that the
UAV will not fly into. This is realistic because if UAV flies
close to the GS, it may be easily discovered. We also define a
large hemisphere which decides the communication coverage
of the G2A link. We model the UAV as the random point
as well, uniformly distributed in the space inside the large
hemisphere but outside the small hemisphere. Define the radius
of the small hemisphere and large hemisphere as R (R > 0)
and r (r > 0) respectively, with R > r.
Moreover, we define the transmit power at GS as P and the
noise power of G2A and G2V as σ2a and σ
2
v , respectively. For
simplicity, we assume that σ2a = σ
2
v = σ





= 1. For the G2A link, we assume that it is
dominated by the line-of-sight (LoS) channels. Therefore, the
received SNR at the UAV can be given by γU = ρUdαUU
, where
dU denotes the distance between the ground station and UAV,
ρU =
PτU
σ2 , αU is the path loss exponent and τU captures
the received channel gain, including carrier frequency, antenna
gain, etc. Then, the CDF of dU can be obtained as
FdU (x) =

0, x < r
x3−r3
R0
, r ≤ x ≤ R
1, x > R
(1)
where R0 = R3 − r3.
Lemma 1. The CDF and PDF of γU can respectively be
FγU (x) =









RαU ≤ x ≤
ρU
rαU

















Proof: Similar to [6], [7], [8], the CDF of γU is as
















By using (1), one obtains the CDF of γU as (2). By taking
the first-order derivative of (2), one obtains the PDF as (3).
For the G2V link, we consider it is affected by both large-
scale signal loss and small-scale fading. Thus, the received
SNR at GV is modeled as γV =
ρV |gSV |2
(dV )
αV , where ρV =
PτV
σ2 ,
τV is the received channel gain at GV, including carrier
frequency, antenna gain, etc, dV denotes the distance between
the GV and GS, αV is the path loss exponent, gSV denotes
the small-scale fading following the Nakagami-m distribution









where m is shape parameter, which is assumed to be integer
number, and Ω represents the average channel power gains.
Then, one has the CDF of distance dV as
FdV (x) =

0, x < 0
x2
D2 , 0 ≤ x ≤ D
1, x > D
. (5)
Next, we apply the following lemma to show the statistical
features of γV .
Lemma 2. One can have the CDF of γV given as follows
in terms of Meijer’s G-function:





























where η1 = mΩρV , η2 =
mDαV
ΩρV
, Υ (·, ·) is the lower incomplete
Gamma function, as defined in [10, (8.350.1)], and Gm,np,q [·] is
the Meijer’s G-function as defined in [10, (9.301)].
Proof: By utilizing [10, (8.351.1)], [10, (9.31.5)] and [11,
3
8.4.16.1], the CDF of γV is given by





























































where η1 = mΩρV , η2 =
mDαV
ΩρV
, Υ (·, ·) is lower incomplete
Gamma function defined by [10, (8.350.1)], and Gm,np,q [·] is
Meijer’s G-function, defined by [10, (9.301)] and [12].
III. DETECTION OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The detection probability is defined as that the instantaneous
channel capacity of G2V is higher than that of G2A. In this
case, it is possible for the GV from home country to detect
and/or eavesdrop the wireless communication between the
enemy’s ground station and its UAV, similarly to the idea of
physical layer security. As a result, the home country may
defend itself against the attack from the enemy’s UAV. To this
end, the instantaneous detection capacity is expressed as
Cs (γV , γU ) = max {log2 (1 + γV )− log2 (1 + γU ) , 0} .
(8)
In (8), the detection event is encountered when the instanta-
neous detection capacity of G2V to G2A link becomes higher
than the detection rate threshold, Cth (Cth ≥ 0). Then, one















FγV (ΘγU + Θ− 1) fγU (γU ) dγU ,
(9)
where Θ = 2Cth . It should be noted that obtaining a closed-
form result for Eq. (9) is almost impossible and/or too com-
plex. Furthermore, it may be calculated by using numerical
analysis [13]. To gain more insights, in the subsequent section,
the lower bound of the DOP is proposed, which has been
utilized in several others works such as [14], by
PLDOP = Pr {γV ≤ ΘγU} =
∫ ∞
0
FγV (Θx) fγU (x) dx.
(10)





















where β1 = r and β2 = R. With the help of Lemma 3, the
approximation of DOP, i.e. (9) can be obtained.
Proof: Substituting (3) and (6) into (10) and utilizing [11,
























































where β1 = r and β2 = R.
In the simulation presented in Section V, one can see that
the above expression matches the simulation results very well
in most cases.
IV. AVERAGE DETECTION CAPACITY
In this paper, average detection capacity (ADC) is defined
as the expected value of detection capacity of G2V over G2A,
which can be given by






Cs (γV , γU ) f (γV , γU ) dγV dγU ,
(13)
where f(γU , γV ) is the joint PDF of γU and γV . The ADC
is an important metric to estimate the average detection prob-
ability of home country’s capacity to detect and/or eavesdrop
the enemy’s UAV.
As the detection and communication channels are indepen-






















where F̄γU (γ) and F̄γV (γ) is the complementary CDF of γU
and γV , and C̄V denotes the ergodic capacity of the desired
link, and C̄Loss represents the capacity loss.













































































Then, the proof is completed.

















































Similar to [7], one can apply Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature
to get the closed-form solution of (17) by using [15, Eq.
(25.4.30)] or calculate it numerically, which is omitted here
to make the paper compact. Then, C̄s can be computed by
using C̄V in (16) and C̄Loss in (17). In the next section, we
will show the numerical results.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to
validate the effectiveness of the derived DOP and ADC. The
simulations are conducted by using Matlab 2018a and the
curves labelled ‘Simulation’ are obtained by randomly and
uniformly deploying the UAV in the specified region for 106
times. For Figs. 2 - 4, we evaluate the performance of the DOP,
where the ‘Approximation’ curve is obtained by Lemma 3. For
Figs. 5 - 7, we examine the performance of the ADC, where
the ‘Approximation’ curve is obtained by Lemma 4 and (17).
A. DOP
For Figs. 2 - 4, we show the DOP versus D for various
r, where Cth = 1 bit/s/Hz is set in these figures. In Fig.
2, we assume m = 1, R = 12000 m, αV = 2, αU = 2,
ρU = ρV = 130 dB, where one can see that with the
increase of detection distance D, the DOP increases. This is
because with the increase of the distance from the GV to GS,
the SNR of G2V link decreases, and therefore the detection
capacity deteriorates. Also, one sees that with the increase of
communication distance of UAV r, the DOP decreases. This
is because it is easier to detect UAV when UAV flies far from
the GS, as GS may increase the SNR to communicate with
UAV, resulting in better SNR received by GV for detection.
In Fig. 3, we increase m from 1 to 2 while keeping the other
parameters unchanged. Comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 2, one sees


















Fig. 2. DOP versus D for r = 4000 m, 7000 m and 10000 m, with m = 1,
R = 12000 m, αV = 2, αU = 2 and ρU = ρV = 130 dB.





















Fig. 3. DOP versus D for r = 4000 m, 7000 m and 10000 m, with m = 2,
R = 12000 m, αV = 2, αU = 2 and ρU = ρV = 130 dB.
that the DOP decreases. This is because when m changes from
1 to 2, the fading is less serious in the environment, and thus
resulting in lower DOP. In Fig. 4, we examine the DOP versus
D with the path loss parameter setting to αV = 4 and αU = 4.
We also increase ρU = ρV = 220 dB to combat the severe path
loss. This figure shows the scenario that both the UAV and GV
experience the serious path loss. Similarly, one can see that
in Fig. 4, with the increase of detection distance in G2V link
or decrease of communication distance in G2A link, the DOP






















Fig. 4. DOP versus D for r = 4000 m, 7000 m and 10000 m, with m = 1,
R = 12000 m, αV = 4, αU = 4 and ρU = ρV = 220 dB.
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increases, as the reason explained before. Additionally, one
can see that with the increase of the communication distance
r or the decrease of detection distance D, the DOP reduces,
resulting in better detection performance.
In all these cases above, one can see that our approximation
of DOP matches well with the simulation results, showing the
accuracy and the usefulness of our proposed expression.
B. ADC
In this subsection, we check the performance of ADC. In
Figs. 5 - Fig. 7, we examine the ADC versus D for various
r, where Cth = 1 bit/s/Hz is set in these figures. In Fig.
5, we set m = 1, R = 12000 m, αV = 2, αU = 2 and
ρU = ρV = 130 dB. One can see that with the increase of


















Fig. 5. ADC versus D for r = 4000 m, 7000 m and 10000 m, with m = 1,
R = 12000 m, αV = 2, αU = 2, αU = 2 and ρU = ρV = 130 dB.
the detection distance, the ADC decreases. This is because the
farther the GV is, the less received SNR the G2V link achieves,
and therefore resulting in lower ADC. Moreover, one can see
that with the increase of the communication distance of UAV
r, the ADC increases. This is because with the increase of r,
the SNR gap between the G2V link and G2A link increases,
resulting in better ADC.
From Fig. 6 to Fig. 5, we increase the Nakagami fading
parameter m from 1 to 2. One can see that the ADC increases.
This is because the less serious fading will improve the
detection capacity. In Fig. 7, we examine the ADC versus D


















Fig. 6. ADC versus D for r = 4000 m, 7000 m and 10000 m, with m = 2,
R = 12000 m, αV = 2, αU = 2 and ρU = ρV = 130 dB
for various r with the path loss exponent setting to αV = 4,
αU = 4, which shows both UAV and GV experience serious
path loss. Similarly with before, one can see that with the
increase of the detection distance D, or decrease of commu-
nication distance r, the ADC decreases, as expected.


















Fig. 7. ADC versus D for r = 4000 m, 7000 m and 10000 m, with m = 1,
R = 12000 m, αV = 4, αU = 4 and ρU = ρV = 220 dB
Again, in all these tests above, one can see that our ‘Approx-
imation’ curve match well with the simulation results, showing
the effectiveness and usefulness of our derived expressions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the DOP and ADC of
G2V over G2A communication systems. Exact expressions
have been shown and to get more insights, tight analytical
approximations have been obtained. One sees that with the
decrease of detection distance or the increase of the com-
munication region or the decrease of the fading influence,
the DOP drops while the ADC improves. Numerical results
have been carried out to verify the effectiveness of the derived
expressions. Future work will focus on multi-UAV scenarios,
such as how to detect multiple UAVs applying the ground
vehicles or deploy the UAVs from home country to detect the
enemy’s UAVs. Also, multiple antennas in both UAVs and
ground stations will be explored. Furthermore, the impact of
interference will be taken into consideration in future work.
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